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Abstract—Due to the increasing adoption of smart meters,
there are growing concerns about consumer privacy risks stem-
ming from the high resolution metering data. To counter these
risks, there have been various works in shaping the grid-visible
energy consumption profile using controllable loads. However,
most works have focused on using energy storage systems (ESSs).
In this paper, we explore the use of flexible thermal loads (FTLs)
for consumer privacy protection. The theoretical limitations of
using FTLs are compared to systems using ESSs. It is shown that
due to the limitations in the operation of FTLs, without significant
over-sizing of systems, and sacrifices in consumer comfort, FTLs
of much higher equivalent energy storage capacity are required
to afford the same level of protection as ESSs. Nonetheless, given
their increasing ubiquity, controllable FTLs should be considered
for use in consumer privacy protection.
Index Terms—consumer privacy, energy management, flexible
thermal loads, smart meter
I. INTRODUCTION
Spurred by grid modernisation efforts, the adoption rate of
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) using smart meters
(SMs) has risen steadily across the globe in recent years.
On one hand, this enables the development of efficient data-
driven grid operation and management methods [1]. On the
other hand, the high-frequency measurement data provided by
AMI can be used to derive the private information of con-
sumers, such as their lifestyle habits, occupation, and religious
inclinations [1]–[3]. This has led to concerns about privacy
risks, and works in quantifying and mitigating these risks, such
as [4]–[8]. Two main families of privacy protection schemes
for consumers with SMs exist, namely smart meter data
manipulation (SMDM) schemes, and user demand shaping
(UDS) schemes [9].
SMDM schemes modify the SM data before it is transmit-
ted, and include consumer aggregation [10], [11], consumer
anonymisation [12], [13], and differential privacy based addi-
tion of noise [14]. However, these methods require trusted
third parties, either in the processing of the data, or in
the supply and installation of SMs with privacy-preserving
firmware. UDS methods, on the other hand, physically alter
the physical energy consumption profile of the consumers
recorded by SMs (grid load), such that it no longer reveals
the private information contained in the underlying privacy
sensitive consumer load (sensitive load). This is achieved by
actively controlling loads to shape the grid load profile, ideally
decoupling it from the sensitive load profile. UDS methods can
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Fig. 1. Possible UDS system setup
typically be implemented behind-the-meter, which avoids the
need for a trusted third-party.
UDS methods can be split into those using energy storage
systems (ESSs), and those controlling flexible consumer loads.
Fig. 1 illustrates a possible system setup for UDS methods,
which is governed by the following equation:
Y = X + S (1)
There are numerous recent works using ESSs, e.g., load level-
ling [5], limiting the load profile to distinct steps [6], and di-
rectly minimising an approximate of mutual information (MI)
[8]. However, UDS methods utilising flexible consumer loads
are scarce in the literature. One such UDS scheme, proposed in
[15], utilises the flexible consumer loads to hide occupancy by
using artificial signature injection and partial load flattening.
The authors then verify their scheme by testing the resultant
load profiles on a few occupancy detection algorithms. While
in [16], optimised electric vehicle charging and electric furnace
are used to obscure recoverable information from non-intrusive
load monitoring (NILM) techniques. Notwithstanding, the use
of flexible consumer loads for general privacy protection
irrespective of the adversarial model is not well studied.
With the development of grid communications infrastruc-
ture and the proliferation of smart appliances, there are also
considerable advances in home energy management systems
(HEMSs) that enable the coordination and scheduling of home
appliances. HEMSs allow for the optimisation of residential
electricity consumption patterns in order to improve efficiency,
economics, and the reliability of residential buildings with
regards to their role in the grid and occupant comfort [17].
Given increasing interest in HEMSs and the ubiquity of
flexible consumer loads, this paper explores the use of HEMSs
to control flexible consumer loads in order to mask the private
information contained in the grid load about the sensitive load.
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
provides a brief overview of privacy for consumers with smart
meters and the use of flexible consumer loads for privacy pro-
tection; Section III provides an analytical comparison between
consumer privacy protection using ESSs and FTLs; Section
IV details the controller design of a HEMS for comparison
of realistic systems; Section V presents numerical results; and
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. CONSUMER PRIVACY PROTECTION
USING FLEXIBLE CONSUMER LOADS
One measure of consumer privacy is the mutual information
(MI) between the sensitive load X and the grid load Y [4], [7],
which measures the amount of information Y reveals about X
and vice versa. The MI between X and Y , which are random
processes, can be given as the average MI between the random
variables Xτ and Yτ that make up the processes [7], [18], i.e.,
I(X;Y ) =
1
k
k∑
τ=1
I(Xτ ;Yτ ) , (2)
where I(Xτ ;Yτ ) is the MI between the random variables Xτ
and Yτ , and k is the number of random variable pairs. This
concept of average MI will be used in Section III for the
analysis of consumer privacy protection.
Given two random variables Xτ and Yτ , the MI between
them is given by a function of their joint probability dis-
tribution function (PDF) pXτ ,Yτ , and marginal distributions,
pXτ , and pYτ . These PDFs are typically unknown, and must
be estimated. Assuming that multiple samples of Xτ and Yτ
are available, the PDFs can be estimated using the histogram
method. Hence, only for the purpose of estimating these PDFs,
assume that the protected and grid loads have finite support,
i.e, Xτ ∈ Xτ := {x¯1, x¯2, · · · , x¯m}, and Yτ ∈ Yτ :=
{y¯1, y¯2, · · · , y¯n}. Then, the MI between Xτ and Yτ can be
given as
I(Xτ ;Yτ ) :=
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
pXτ ,Yτ (x¯
i
τ , y¯
j
τ ) log
pXτ ,Yτ (x¯
i
τ , y¯
j
τ )
pXτ (x¯
i
τ )pYτ (y¯
j
τ )
, (3)
where pA(a) denotes the probability of A = a, and log is the
base-2 logarithm. As X and Y are continuous in reality, the
estimates become more accurate with an increase in m and n;
but this also requires more samples to prevent over-fitting.
In order to minimise leakage of privacy-sensitive informa-
tion, it follows that one needs to minimise the MI between the
sensitive and grid loads. This can be done either using UDS or
SMDM methods as described in Section I, using either ESSs
or flexible consumer loads.
The term flexible consumer loads include thermal loads such
as hot water heaters and space conditioning, schedulable loads
such as clothes and dish washers, and interruptible loads such
as the charging of electric vehicles. Flexible consumer loads
can be classified into the following categories:
a) The flexible loads are not privacy-sensitive, i.e., their
usage does not reveal privacy sensitive information about
the consumer, nor are their presence in a household
considered sensitive private information.
b) The flexible loads are privacy-sensitive with regards to
their time-of-use, but not their presence in the household.
c) The flexible loads are privacy-sensitive, i.e., both their
time-of-use and presence in a household reveal sensitive
private information.
There are no privacy issues arising from their usage if the
flexible loads are of the first category. For loads of the second
category, using them to mask the sensitive load inherently also
masks the private information they reveal: their time-of-use
is shifted and thus, the private information revealed by their
original time-of-use is masked. However, if the flexible loads
are of the third category, then the privacy-protection problem
also needs to consider whether the resulting grid load is able to
mask the electrical signature of the flexible loads, i.e., whether
the sensitive load is able to sufficiently distort the signatures
of the flexible loads.
In this paper, we consider the use of flexible consumer
loads within the first two categories in UDS privacy-protection
schemes. Moreover, we limit our analysis to flexible thermal
loads (FTLs) due to their ability to “store” thermal energy,
and are more likely to be interruptible compared to other
flexible consumer loads such as washing machines that have
minimum cycle times. Inductive FTLs such as heat pumps
have complex on/off cycles and electrical signatures, making
the analysis of their effectiveness in privacy protection com-
plicated. Hence, in order to draw meaningful conclusions, we
will focus on resistance-based FTLs, such as electric-resistance
water heaters, and electric-resistance space heaters. In the next
section, we will compare the theoretical performance of ESS-
based UDS schemes against those using FTLs.
III. COMPARING PRIVACY PROTECTION USING ENERGY
STORAGE SYSTEMS AND FLEXIBLE THERMAL LOADS
Setting aside the distinctive constraints of both ESSs and
FTLs, the privacy protection afforded by them for UDS differs
in one key aspect: ESSs are able to both charge and discharge,
i.e., increase or decrease grid load; while traditional residential
FTLs are only able to “charge”; i.e., they can draw power from
the grid, but typically cannot provide power back to the grid.
Let H(·) := −∑ p(·) log p(·) be the entropy function, with
p(·) being the probability of the variable and H(·) being
minimal when the outcome is certain, and maximal when the
underlying distribution is uniform. Additionally, assume that
the following is true:
(a) No energy wastage is permitted.
(b) The power ratings of the ESS and FTL are sufficiently
large to compensate for the difference between the max-
imum and minimum consumer load, i.e., Pmaxess , P
max
th ≥
Xmax −Xmin.
(c) The controller has perfect knowledge of the efficiency
curves of the ESS and FTL.
(d) The controller has perfect knowledge of the consumer
load X and its average Xmean.
(e) The ESS has infinite energy storage capacity.
(f) Either the FTL has infinite thermal storage capacity, or it
holds for the average electrical equivalent of the consumer
thermal demand Dmeanth that D
mean
th ≥ Pmaxth .
(g) The FTL demand is continuous, i.e., it is not a step-load.
(h) Both ESS and FTL have an initial state-of-charge of 0.5.
Using MI as measure of privacy, the differences in achiev-
able privacy protection by both technologies are discussed in
the remainder of this section.
A. The Loads are Independent and Identically Distributed
Let the random variable pair (X,Y ), and its marginals X
and Y be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), then
by definition, MI, Iiid(X;Y ) can also be written as a function
of their Shannon entropies,
Iiid(X;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y ) . (4)
Proposition 1. Iiid(X;Y ) is minimal when H(Y ) is minimal,
i.e., when |Y ′ := {y ∈ Y | pY (y) > 0}| is minimal.
Proof. The distribution of the consumer load pX(x) is un-
controllable, non-uniform, and the number of outcomes with
non-zero probability is non-singular, i.e., |X ′ := {x ∈
X | pX(x) > 0}| > 1. Hence, H(X) is greater than zero.
Since pX,Y (x, y) is non-uniform, as pX(x) is non-uniform,
H(X,Y ) is limited by the given pX(x). Therefore, Iiid(X;Y )
is minimal when H(Y ) is minimal, i.e., when |Y ′| is minimal,
where Y ′ := {y ∈ Y | pY (y) > 0}, instead of when H(X,Y )
is maximal.
For the rest of the paper, we denote the realisations of the
random variables with lowercase letters, Amean as the average
value of A, Amin as the minimum value that A can take, and
Amax as its maximum value.
It would be trivial to see that perfect privacy, Iiid(X;Y ) = 0
can be achieved by maintaining a constant grid load, y∗,
where pY (y∗) = 1 , and pY (y) = 0 ∀y 6= y∗. Let the
grid load achieved using the ESS be denoted by Yess and
that of FTL by Yth, then there exists y∗ess and y
∗
th such that
Iiid(X;Y
∗
ess) = Iiid(X;Y
∗
th) = 0. While y
∗
ess can be any
arbitrary value Y min ≤ y∗ess ≤ Y max, there is less flexibility for
y∗th, with y
∗
th ≥ Xmax. Nonetheless, the theoretical maximum
privacy can be achieved by both technologies.
In reality, storage capacity is finite, and for most consumers,
it would be unreasonable to assume that the system is un-
dersized, i.e, Dmeanth ≥ Pmaxth , where Dmeanth is the electrical
equivalent of the average power consumption required in order
to maintain consumer comfort. Therefore, assumptions (e) and
(f) are made more stringent such that the storage capacity is
finite, but sufficiently large to average out consumer load (or
thermal demand) over a finite period of time. Additionally,
average thermal demand is now assumed to be large, but less
than the FTL power rating and that Dmeanth + X
mean < Xmax.
For ESSs, the controller would now need to select a constant
grid load such that y∗ess = X
mean+less, where less is the round
trip loss of the ESS. This allows a constant y∗ess that does not
empty or fully charge the ESS. As it would be possible to
sustain y∗ess indefinitely, Iiid(X;Yess) = Iiid(X;Y
∗
ess) = 0.
For FTLs, it follows that y∗th = D
mean
th + X
mean < Xmax.
Assume that Iiid(X;Yth) is still minimised by actuating y∗th
whenever possible. In this case, we now also have y = x 6=
y∗th ,∀x > y∗th. Let k be the total number of samples, and
g(k) the number of instances where x > y∗th, then
Iiid(X;Yth) =
k − g(k)
k
I(X;Y ∗th) +
g(k)
k
H(X) (5a)
=
g(k)
k
H(X) , (5b)
where (5b) follows from the fact that Iiid(X;Y ∗th) = 0 and
y = x , ∀x > y∗th. Thus, Iiid(X;Yess) < Iiid(X;Yth) as
H(X) > 0, i.e., privacy loss using FTLs for UDS schemes is,
under the given assumptions on equivalent storage size, greater
than those using ESSs given these assumptions.
B. The Loads are First-Order Markov Processes
The random variables (X,Y ), X , and Y are not i.i.d. in
reality, and could be better modelled using first-order Markov
processes, of which the MI, Im(X;Y ) [7] is given by
Im(X;Y ) =
1
k
[
k∑
i=2
I(Xi, Xi−1;Yi, Yi−1)−
k∑
i=3
I(Xi−1, Yi−1)
]
. (6)
Expressing (6) in terms of entropy,
Im(X;Y ) =
1
k
{
H(X2, X1) +H(Y2, Y1)−
H(X2, X1, Y2, Y1) +
k∑
i=3
[
H(Xi, Xi−1)+
H(Yi, Yi−1)−H(Xi, Xi−1, Yi, Yi−1)−
H(Xi−1)−H(Yi−1) +H(Xi−1, Yi−1)
]}
.
Note that if the random variables (X,Y ), X , and Y are higher-
order Markov processes, then (6) forms the upper bound on
the actual MI [7]. As k →∞,
Im(X;Y ) ≈ 1
k
{ k∑
i=3
[
H(Xi, Xi−1) +H(Yi, Yi−1)−
H(Xi, Xi−1, Yi, Yi−1)−H(Xi−1)−
H(Yi−1) +H(Xi−1, Yi−1)
]}
.
It is trivial to see that Proposition 1 still holds, and that
Im(X;Y ) is minimal when the entropy of Y is minimal.
Moreover, when assumptions (a) to (g) hold, then both
Im(X;Y
∗
ess) and Im(X;Y
∗
th) are minimal and equal to zero.
Now, assume that the Markov processes (X,Y ), X , and Y
are also stationary, i.e., H(X1) = H(X2) = · · · = H(Xk),
H(Y1) = H(Y2) = · · · = H(Yk), H(X1, X2) = H(X2, X3)
= · · · = H(Xk−1, Xk), H(Y1, Y2) = H(Y2, Y3) = · · · =
H(Yk−1, Yk), and that assumptions (e) and (f) are made
more stringent as in the i.i.d. case. Then, Im(X;Yess) =
Im(X;Y
∗
ess) = 0, while
Im(X;Yth) ≈ g1(k)
k
· 0 + g2(k)
k
H(Xτ ) +
g3(k)
k
[
H(Xτ , Xτ−1)−H(Xτ )
]
=
g2(k)− g3(k)
k
H(Xτ ) +
g3(k)
k
H(Xτ , Xτ−1) , τ ∈ {2, 3, · · · , k} ,
where the function g1(k) gives the number of instances
where (yth,i = yth,i−1 = y∗th) or (yth,i = y
∗
th, yth,i−1 =
xth,i−1), g2(k) the number of instances where (yth,i =
xth,i, yth,i−1 = y∗th), g3(k) the number of instances where
(yth,i = xTh,i, yth,i−1 = xth,i−1), and g1(k) + g2(k) +
g3(k) = k − 2 [7]. As H(Xτ ) > 0, H(Xτ , Xτ−1) > 0,
and H(Xτ , Xτ−1) > H(Xτ ) (because Xτ and Xτ−1 are not
perfectly correlated), therefore, Im(X;Yth) > Im(X;Yess).
C. Privacy Protection for Actual Systems
For actual systems, the load distributions vary according to
the consumer household’s state, and their characterisation is
the subject of much research. Despite this, consumer privacy
is protected if one can achieve a “flat” grid load that has
zero entropy, i.e., zero MI between the sensitive and grid
loads. While assumptions (d) and (g) do not hold in reality, it
would be possible to implement systems with sufficient storage
capacity to average out consumer load (thermal demand). For
ESS-based schemes, one would be able to select yess close to
y∗ess, given a sufficiently large sample size, as the accuracy of
the consumer load sample mean Xˆmean → Xmean as k → ∞.
In addition to Xmean, the achievable privacy protection of FTL-
based UDS schemes is also dependent on Dmeanth and the ratio
of Xmax to Xmean, which are usually fixed and directly affects
the number of instances when yth = y∗th. Note that a larger
Xmax to Xmean ratio would require a larger Dmeanth to achieve
the same level of privacy protection and vice versa. It would
be difficult to compare the performance of actual ESS and
FTL-based UDS privacy protection schemes, especially since
there is a lot of uncertainty in the system parameters for FTLs.
Even so, given the analysis above, the additional dependencies
of FTL-based schemes (stochastic thermal demand and depen-
dencies on the ambient environment), and the fact that most
FTLs are step-loads, properly designed ESS-based schemes
should outperform their FTL-based counterparts.
IV. FORMULATION OF THE OPTIMISATION PROBLEM FOR
NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We compare the performance of privacy protection using
ESSs and FTLs in realistic systems by simulating a multi-
objective model-predictive control based HEMS controller.
For FTLs, we analyse the use of electric hot water heaters
(EWHs) and electric resistance space heaters (ERHs), as
they better match the analysis in Section III compared to
other FTL types. In this section, the modelling of the ESS
and FTLs, the formulation of the privacy objective, and the
overall optimisation problems used in the HEMS controllers
are presented.
A. Privacy Objective
To verify the analysis in Section III, we adopt a privacy
objective function that directly minimises an approximation
of (3). This MI approximate, as proposed in [8], assumes that
X and Y are i.i.d., and is given by:
I(X;Y ) ≈ I˜(Xw;Yw)
:=
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(
aijw +
1
Nε
w+W∑
τ=w
zijτ
)
×{
log
aijw
bjwciw
+
ν
aijwNε
w+W∑
τ=w
zijτ −
ν
bjτNε
w+W∑
τ=w
m∑
h=1
zhjτ
}
, (7)
at time w, where W +1 is the prediction horizon, aijw , b
j
w, and
ciw are constants used in the estimation of the PDFs pX,Y , pX
and pY , Nε is the total number of observations used in the
estimate, ν := 1/ loge 2 and z
ij
τ ∈ 0, 1 are binary variables
used to estimate the PDFs. See [8] for details on its derivation.
Here, we relax binary variables zijτ , i.e., let z
ij
τ ∈ [0, 1],
in order to make (7) a convex function, and overcome the
scalability issues identified in [8]. This relaxation affects the
performance of the controller in terms of minimising MI,
but this is outside the scope of this paper. The following
constraints are required in the optimisation of (7):
n∑
j=1
zi
∗j
τ = 1 (8)
zijτ = 0 , ∀ i 6= i∗ (9)
n∑
j=1
zi
∗j
τ y¯
j−1 ≤ yτ <
n∑
j=1
zi
∗j
τ y¯
j , (10)
where i∗ is the index corresponding to the given value of xτ ,
y¯0 = Y min, y¯n = Y max, and constraint (10) links the grid load
to the MI approximate.
B. Modelling of an ESS
Two variables Pc and Pd are used to model the instanta-
neous charging and discharging powers of the ESS, respec-
tively, in order to capture the different efficiencies during
charge and discharge. Additionally, a binary variable Bess is
introduced to prevent the simultaneous charging and discharg-
ing of the ESS. Let Eτ be the energy remaining in the ESS at
time τ , the following constraints are used to model the ESS
in the optimisation problem:
0 ≤ Pc,τ ≤ Bess,τPmaxc (11)
0 ≤ Pd,τ ≤ (1−Bess,τ )Pmaxd (12)
0 ≤ Eτ ≤ Emax (13)
Eτ+1 = Eτ + ∆t(ηcPc,τ − ηdPd,τ ) (14)
Sτ = Pc,τ − Pd,τ , (15)
where ηc and ηd are the charging and discharging efficiencies
of the ESS, respectively, and ∆t is the interval of τ .
C. Modelling of an Electric Hot Water Heater
The thermodynamics in a hot water tank can be modelled
by splitting the tank into several sections (nodes). A two-node
EWH model proposed in [19] is adopted in order to better
capture the thermodynamics of a real device. As the original
model was developed for an electric heat pump, we modify it
by replacing the coefficient of performance (COP) with one.
Also, we assume a temperature dead-band of 1◦C around the
temperature set-point. This water heater model is given by the
following constraints in the optimisation problem:
T lowewh,τ+1 = T
low
ewh,τ +
∆t
Clowewh
[
UAlowewh
(
T inair,τ − T lowewh,τ
)
+
∆mhw,τCp
(
Tms − T lowewh,τ
)
+ Pmaxewh U
low
ewh,τ
]
(16)
Tupewh,τ+1 = T
low
ewh,τ +
∆t
Cupewh
[
UAupewh
(
T inair,τ − Tupewh,τ
)
+
∆mhw,τCp
(
T lowewh,τ − Tupewh,τ
)
+ Pmaxewh U
up
ewh,τ
]
(17)
T absminewh ≤ Tupewh,τ ≤ T absmaxewh (18)
T lowewh,τ ≤ Tupewh,τ (19)
U lowewh,τ + U
up
ewh,τ ≤ 1 (20)
Sτ =P
max
ewh U
low
ewh,τ + P
max
ewh U
up
ewh,τ (21)
where superscripts low and up represent the values for the
lower and upper nodes of the tank, respectively. Tewh,τ is
the water temperature of the node, T inair,τ is the indoor air
temperature, ∆mhw,τ is the hot water draw, and Uewh,τ ∈ [0, 1]
is the duty cycle of the EWH tank node at time τ . Also, Cewh
is the thermal capacitance of the tank node, UAewh is the heat
loss coefficient of the node, Cp is the heat capacity of water,
Tms is the mains water temperature, Pmaxewh is the rated power
of the EWH, T absminewh is the minimum water temperature
required for safety (to mitigate Legionella bacterium growth
in pipework), and T absmaxewh is the maximum permissible water
temperature of the EWH. Furthermore, to take into account
consumer comfort, variables zcomfτ ∈ R≥0 with constraints:(
T setewh − 1◦C
)− T lowewh,τ ≤ zcomfτ (22)
Tupewh,τ −
(
T setewh + 1
◦C
) ≤ zcomfτ , (23)
are introduced to penalise deviations from consumer set-points
for the EWH water T setewh .
D. Modelling an Electric Resistance Space Heater
To model the dynamics of the space heating system, a
data-driven model proposed in [20] is adopted. Similarly,
we replace the coefficient of performance (COP) with one,
to match the ERH. The model coefficients are derived by
using statistical learning on data recorded from actual heating
systems. The following constraint captures the dynamics of
the system
T inair,τ+1 = T
in
air,τ + γ1
(
T outair,τ − T inair,τ
)
+ γ2
(
Uerh,τP
max
erh
)
+ γ3Pirr,τ
(24)
where γ1, γ2, and γ3 are parameters learned from data, T inair,τ
and T outair,τ are the indoor and outdoor temperatures at time τ ,
respectively, Uerh,τ ∈ [0, 1] is the ERH duty cycle, Pirr,τ is
the solar irradiance at time τ ,and Pmaxerh is the rated power
of the ERH. Similar to the EWH, the proxy comfort variables
zcomfτ are used to penalise deviations from consumer set-points.
However, as deviations in indoor temperature affect consumer
comfort to a higher degree than hot water temperatures,
deviations (per ◦C) are penalised with a larger coefficient:
10
[(
T seterh − 1◦C
)− T inair,τ] ≤ zcomfτ (25)
10
[
T inair,τ −
(
T seterh + 1
◦C
)] ≤ zcomfτ , (26)
where T setair is the consumer indoor temperature set-point.
E. Optimisation Problem for ESS-based HEMS Controller
For the ESS-based HEMS controller, the following objective
function is used:
minimise
yτ ,z
ij
τ
1
W + 1
w+W∑
τ=w
cτyτ + µw I˜(Xw;Yw)
subject to yτ , zijτ ∈ Fτ ,
(27)
where cτ is the cost of energy, µw is the price-of-privacy-loss,
and the set Fτ enforces constraints (1), and (8) to (15).
The inclusion of the energy costs penalises the charging
of the ESS during high-price periods, and when coupled
with lower prices-of-privacy-loss, discourages multiple charge-
discharge cycles within a day. This allows a better comparison
with FTL-based systems, which cannot “discharge”, and hence
have equivalent energy storage capacities limited by the aver-
age daily thermal demand and system losses.
F. Optimisation Problems for FTL-based HEMS Controller
In addition to the energy costs, the optimisation objective
for FTLs should also minimise consumer comfort violations.
We minimise ‖zcomf‖22, zcomf := [zcomfw , zcomfw+1, · · · , zcomfw+W ]>,
which imposes larger penalties for larger comfort violations.
Thus, the optimisation problem for an EWH based HEMS
controller is given by
minimise
yτ ,z
ij
τ ,zcomf
1
W + 1
w+W∑
τ=w
cτyτ + µw I˜(Xw;Yw) + ρw‖zcomf‖22
subject to yτ , zijτ , z
comf ∈ F ′th,τ ,
(28)
where ρw is the consumer comfort coefficient, and the set
F ′th,τ enforces the constraints (1), (8) to (10), and (16) to
(23). For a system with both an EWH and an ERH, set F ′th,τ
in (28) is replaced with the set F ′′th,τ , which now also includes
constraints (24) to (26).
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
House 23618 from the Residential Building Stock Assess-
ment database [21] was used for the numerical simulations.
This house is based in Emmett, Idaho, USA, which has a
semi-arid climate with cold winters and multiple heating-
days. Weather data with 5-minute resolution from Boulder,
Colorado, USA, which has a similar climate was used in the
simulations. The HEMS controllers from Section IV were
simulated for 180 heating-days with hourly resolution in
MATLAB 2018a and the Gurobi 8.1.0 optimisation solver.
For simplicity, we assume that the incoming water supply
temperature is constant, and that µw and ρw, which can be
time-dependent, are also constant. Moreover, for ease of com-
parison, we assume that the controller has perfect knowledge
of the sensitive load across the prediction horizon, and that the
models used in the controller accurately represent the actual
systems. The equivalent energy storage capacity of an FTL is
hard to estimate, depends on many stochastic parameters such
as weather conditions and consumer behaviour, and remains
and ongoing field of research. For the simulations, we assumed
that this capacity is given by the average daily thermal demand
of the household over the simulation period, considering the
TABLE I
GENERAL SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Prediction horizon, W + 1: 24
Nε: 201.6
Number of X Bins, m: 24
Number of Y Bins, n: 24
Energy Price (peak): 24.6 cents/kWh
Energy Price (off-peak): 13.15 cents/kWh
Minimum grid load, Y min: 0 kW
Maximum grid load, Y max: 12 kW
TABLE II
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
ESS EWH ERH
Equivalent storage cap.: 6.29 kWh 6.29 kWh 32.63 kWh
Power rating: 5.5 kW 5.5 kW 4.5 kW
Efficiency/COP: 96% 1 1
Absolute min. temp.: - 50◦C -
Absolute max. temp.: - 90◦C -
Consumer set-point: - 75◦C 22◦C
Mains water temp.: - 10◦C -
Water heat cap., Cp: - 4.19 kJ/K -
Clowewh : - 356.15 kJ/K -
Cupewh: - 356.15 kJ/K -
Therm. coeff., UAlowewh : - 5.82e-4 kW/K -
Therm. coeff., UAupewh: - 5.82e-4 kW/K -
γ1: - - 1.50e-2
γ2: - - 1.86e-1
γ3: - - 3.45e-1
simulation setup and assumptions. The general simulation
parameters are given in Table I, while Table II gives the system
specific parameters. For the FTL-based controllers, ρw = 10.
The majority of EWHs and ERHs that are currently installed
are step loads. Hence, to better match realistic systems, the
continuous duty-cycles from the hourly HEMS controllers
were also converted into 5-minute on-off cycles by a secondary
controller. This controller attempts to match the HEMS’ duty
cycle, whilst also enforcing the FTL constraints in Section
IV at 5-minute resolution. To further explore the privacy-
protection of both ESS and FTL-based systems, HEMS con-
trollers that do not consider energy costs were also simulated.
Fig. 2 shows the load profiles from an ESS-based system
and an EWH based system with discretised control actions
(5-minute simulation interval), with µw = 5, and considering
energy costs. As illustrated, the reduced flexibility of the
EWH based system limits its ability to mask the sensitive
load, resulting in more instances where the sensitive load is
revealed, e.g., around time steps 3090 to 3100. The ESS is also
shown to have a single charge-discharge cycle within 24 hours.
Here, H(X;Y ) is maximised instead as it was impossible to
achieve minimal H(Y ). Quantitatively, the privacy leakage
of the various systems were assessed by first treating the
loads as i.i.d. (IID MI) processes, and then as stationary first-
order Markov processes (Markov MI); using the MI estimation
methods described in [18]. It is important to note that the
MI estimation methods assume that the FTLs are not privacy-
sensitive, i.e., the privacy leakage from the FTL use is not
considered. This is particularly important when interpreting
the results when µw = 0 and energy cost is not considered in
the objective function. Table III summarises the MI estimates
from the various systems.
Both the ESS and EWH systems reached their privacy
protection limit without sacrificing the other objectives with
µw = 5. As seen, the ESS system has less than half the
privacy leakage compared to the EWH system with µw > 0.
Without considering energy costs, it can be seen that the ESS
achieves much lower MI values, while there is only marginal
improvement for the EWH due to comfort considerations. With
a maximum water draw of 112 l within an hour from the 170
l hot water tank, there is insufficient flexibility when using the
EWH to protect privacy with a 1◦C dead-band. The marginal
increase in MI for the ESS without energy costs is due to
the binary variables (multiple solution candidates). Moreover,
at hourly simulation intervals, the EWH model is inaccurate,
as can be seen from the step load versus non-step load EWH
simulations. The actual operation of the EWH differs from the
solution of the hourly control actions, as the system dynamics
require the secondary controller to make minor adjustments in
order to prevent constraint violations (e.g. more accurate water
mixing and loss modelling). Hence, in reality one should use
models that better represent the continuous dynamics of the
thermal system, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. The
minor adjustments by the secondary controller eventually led
to minor reduction in MI in most cases, but that is coincidental.
Even when combining the EWH with an ERH, the privacy
protection afforded still falls below that of the ESS with a
fraction of storage capacity for µw > 0. More importantly,
the use of the ERH for privacy entails a significant Markov
MI increase, due to the time-correlated dynamics of the
system. The limitation of the ERH in providing more privacy
protection again lies in the fact that the temperature dead-
band is 1◦C, limiting flexibility, even when energy costs are
ignored. This dead-band prevents over-heating the space or
letting it cool below comfortable levels. Note that there is a
very low IID MI when µw = 0 for the combined EWH and
ERH system. This is due to the fact that coincidentally, the
period when there is high space heating demand is also the
period with high private information leakage (occupied and
low-load night periods); and that the ERH usage is assumed
to not reveal private information.
While there is substantial MI reduction for all systems even
with µw = 0 (the entropy / MI for the sensitive load is 2.710
bits), if the EWH and ERH usage is privacy-sensitive, then at
µw = 0, the EWH and ERH profiles are unprotected and fully
reveal the information contained by their usage.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE OUTLOOK
In this paper, we studied the use of resistive FTLs for
consumer privacy protection using UDS methods. Theoretical
analysis shows that due to the fact that FTLs cannot compen-
sate sensitive load by “discharging”, the level of protection
afforded by them is below that of ESSs. Moreover, as seen
from numerical experiments, the inflexibility of these systems
due to the time-specific nature of thermal demand limits
their performance; unless one allows for large temperature
fluctuations or use largely over-sized systems. Nonetheless,
controllable FTLs are able to afford some level of privacy
protection, and should be utilised for privacy protection given
their increasing ubiquity in households. Future work will
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Fig. 2. Sensitive load, and grid loads with µw = 5
TABLE III
PRIVACY LOSS OF THE SIMULATED SYSTEMS WITH A 24-HOUR PREDICTION HORIZON
µw = 0 µw = 5 µw = 10
IID MI Markov MI IID MI Markov MI IID MI Markov MI
ESS with energy costs 0.565 0.709 0.286 0.678 0.287 0.653
ESS without energy costs - - 0.149 0.672 0.154 0.671
Step load EWH with energy costs 0.656 0.859 0.655 0.837 0.647 0.823
Step load EWH without energy costs 0.658 0.831 0.633 0.817 0.633 0.817
Non-step load EWH with energy costs 0.791 0.941 0.693 0.870 0.679 0.864
Non-step load EWH without energy costs 0.813 0.915 0.628 0.821 0.628 0.824
Step load EWH and ERH with energy costs 0.367 1.062 0.362 1.066 0.362 1.080
Step load EWH and ERH without energy costs 0.136 0.788 0.326 1.214 0.326 1.208
consider the use of inductive loads and loads with interruptible,
but fixed cycle lengths.
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